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How the Mass Media Divide Us
Abstract
The chapters in this book suggest that scholars are nowhere near a consensus on whether the mass public is
more polarized than it has been in the past and, if it is, relative to precisely when. Nonetheless, among those
who believe the mass public has, indeed, become increasingly polarized in its views, mass media are very likely
to be invoked as a cause. Perhaps this should come as no surprise - throughout American history, mass media
have been blamed for just about every social ill that has befallen the country.
But in the midst of so much disagreement about when and whether and among whom this phenomenon has
occurred, why is there so much agreement that media must somehow be to blame? A consensus on this point
exists not so much because the empirical evidence is overwhelming, but because there are multiple theories
that predict and explain how media might logically influence levels of mass polarization. Furthermore, it is
possible to view mass media as engines of polarization even if one believes the public in general has not
become polarized to any significant degree. Mass media are, after all, only one influence in a much larger
system of institutions and influences.
For purposes of this chapter, I set aside the question of whether and to what extent mass polarization has
occurred, in favor of an exploration of ways in which media have been implicated in polarizing processes. How
might mass media be contributing to this widely decried state of affairs? And even if the public has not
polarized, how might mass media nonetheless be encouraging mass opinion in more extreme directions?
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The chapters in this book suggest that scholars are nowhere near a consensuson whether the mass public is more polarized than it has been in the past
and, if it is, relative to precisely when. Nonetheless, among those who believe
the mass public has, indeed, become increasingly polarized in its views, mass
media are very likely to be invoked as a cause. Perhaps this should come as no
surprise—throughout American history, mass media have been blamed for just
about every social ill that has befallen the country.
But in the midst of so much disagreement about when and whether and
among whom this phenomenon has occurred, why is there so much agreement
that media must somehow be to blame? A consensus on this point exists not so
much because the empirical evidence is overwhelming, but because there are
multiple theories that predict and explain how media might logically influence
levels of mass polarization. Furthermore, it is possible to view mass media as
engines of polarization even if one believes the public in general has not become
polarized to any significant degree. Mass media are, after all, only one influence
in a much larger system of institutions and influences.
For purposes of this chapter, I set aside the question of whether and to what
extent mass polarization has occurred, in favor of an exploration of ways in
which media have been implicated in polarizing processes. How might mass
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media be contributing to this widely decried state of affairs? And even if the
public has not polarized, how might mass media nonetheless be encouraging
mass opinion in more extreme directions?
More from Which to Choose
One obvious and unmistakable characteristic of the current media landscape is
choice. No one questions the idea that there is more choice, that there are more
media outlets now than thirty or forty years ago. As political scientist Markus
Prior notes in a forthcoming book, television provided a mere seven channels to the
average household in 1970, and the three broadcast networks captured 80 percent
of all viewing. By 2005, over 85 percent of households had cable or satellite access,
and the average viewer had a choice of about a hundred channels. There are
now more broadcast networks than in 1970, but they collectively capture only
40 percent of viewing.1 When one adds to this the choices offered by “new
media”—the Internet, cell phones, iPods, and the like—then it seems indisputable
that Americans have more media choice than ever before.
There are two different theories that tie increased media choice to higher levels
of political polarization. One argument points to the increased number of choices
people have in sources of political news as a cause of polarization. An altogether
different theory suggests that it is the expansion of choices of nonpolitical enter-
tainment media content that is most consequential for mass polarization.
Choosing Sources of Political News
Greater choice in sources of political news is relevant to political polarization
because it means that people must decide on some basis which sources to use
and which not to use. More optimistic scholars have suggested that perhaps this
will lead the United States toward a better approximation of a true “marketplace”
of ideas, one in which people are exposed to many different perspectives and can
weigh a broader range of views in formulating their opinions than was once the
case. This idealistic vision is appealing, but for the most part scholars have
focused on the other side of this double-edged sword: more choice also means that
people can more easily limit their exposure based on their own predispositions.
To the extent that the many sources of political news have identifiable political
complexions, some people may end up choosing news sources that reinforce and
intensify their preexisting views. In academic jargon, this phenomenon goes by
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the name of “selectivity” or “biased assimilation of information.” Selectivity can
take place at several junctures with respect to mass media, including exposure to
a particular source of political news, attention to what the source says, and biased
interpretation when processing the content of political news. Because exposure
to a source of political news is a prerequisite for any of the subsequent kinds of
selection to become relevant, selective exposure has been the target of the greatest
research attention.
Concerns about selective exposure date back to the very earliest selection studies
conducted in the 1940s by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia
University.2 These early studies became closely linked with psychologist Leon
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance.3 Festinger suggested that people want
to avoid information that conflicts with their preexisting beliefs, and that they
seek out information—through activities such as selective exposure—that con-
firms their current beliefs. Although a trickle of studies of selective exposure to
partisan information continued over the past five decades, a renewed interest in
the topic has been spawned by the relatively recent proliferation of news outlets.
Moreover, as a result of television programs that now appear more unabashedly
partisan, more scholars are finding this hypothesis and its potential polarizing
influence worthy of study.
What do these recent studies suggest about whether selective exposure to
like-minded political content occurs and thus contributes to a more extreme
public? Do people select media content that is compatible with their own views and
avoid exposure to alternative opinions? There is, for better or worse, no simple
answer to these questions, in part because the internal context of these studies
varies, but also because the external context—that is, the media environment—has
changed so tremendously since the 1940s, when the hypothesis was formulated.
Studies of the real-world context in which media choices are made tend to
support the selective exposure hypothesis, but with important limitations. If one
compares the political views promoted by any given medium with the political
views held by that medium’s audience, investigators regularly find significant
relationships. For example, conservatives are more likely to read conservative
newspapers, and liberals are more likely to read liberal ones.
Unfortunately, such correlations are very limited in what they tell us about
the public’s propensity to selectively expose itself to political information. Most
obviously, it is possible that the partisan leanings of the media sources influenced
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the readers, viewers, or listeners, so that they ended up holding similar political
perspectives. In this case, a relationship between the partisanship of a news
source and the partisanship of its audience cannot necessarily be attributed to
selective exposure. For example, in David Barker’s panel study of Rush Limbaugh
listeners, he finds that regular listeners developed an antipathy toward Rush
Limbaugh’s favorite targets, thus suggesting that influence as well as selective
exposure was occurring.4
Yet another prominent reason that these kinds of relationships are often dis-
missed is because of the lack of direct evidence that people are actually making
choices motivated by a desire to avoid dissimilar perspectives. In their influential
review of the literature on both political and nonpolitical forms of selective
exposure, David O. Sears and Jonathan L. Freedman suggested that the similar-
ity between audiences’ opinions and the opinions of their media sources was
because of “de facto selective exposure.”5 According to this line of thought, a
correlation exists between the opinions of an information source and its audi-
ence, but not because the audience is motivated to avoid disagreeable views, or
because it is influenced by the media. Instead, the correlation arises because media
environments tend to supply more like-minded sources of information to the
bulk of the populations they reach than they supply dissonant sources. Red states
tend to have more conservative newspapers than blue states, but according to
the de facto interpretation it is not because Republicans have chosen not to read
more liberal newspapers—thus driving them out of business. Instead, they read
conservative newspapers because, in conservative regions, they are more widely
available than liberal ones.
Of course, a consideration of market forces turns this argument into a bit of
a chicken-and-egg debate. For instance, does Provo, Utah, not have any liberal-
leaning media because no one there would choose to consume it, or can no one
choose it because it is not available there? In their review of the evidence in the
1960s, Sears and Freedman emphasized the latter, suggesting that much of what
had been deemed as evidence that audiences were motivated to avoid oppositional
political perspectives was really evidence of de facto selective exposure.
However, the preponderance of evidence cited in recent studies confirms that
partisan audiences do select media that lean in the direction of their own views.
And the evidence of such a relationship is common across virtually all forms of
media. Talk-radio listeners are likely to have views similar to those of the host
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whose program they listen to, Republicans are more likely to be viewers of the
right-leaning Fox News Channel, and political films such as Fahrenheit 9/11 are
attended primarily by those who are already sympathetic to the films’ political
perspectives. Likewise, visitors to a candidate’s website will predominantly already
be the candidate’s supporters.6 Even when political differences in media are fairly
muted, such as when there are two competing daily newspapers in the same city,
there is evidence that people systematically choose to read the newspaper with
an editorial slant closer to their own politics.7 In this case, availability is held
constant (making the de facto interpretation moot), providing clear evidence of
politically motivated selective exposure.8
Although it seems logical to conclude from this that partisans on both sides
would, as a result, polarize further in the direction of their original views, this
consequence is not yet well documented. Studies of small group interactions
have suggested that like-minded company leads to greater attitude extremity,
but there is little evidence to date that documents that same process of influence
with like-minded mass media.9 Moreover, if this process of reinforcement has
been taking place all along, why have scholars only begun to suspect selective
exposure as a cause of greater polarization in recent years?
Heightened concern about mass media’s role in polarization stems from an
increase in partisan differences across the many news sources now available to
citizens. Selective exposure requires that people associate particular news sources
with particular brands of politics. So although it is unlikely that people today
are any more selective than they ever were, the media environment itself has
made being selective easier than it was in the past, just by offering more diverse
sources. Just how much easier selectivity is now remains unclear. Few mainstream
news sources bill themselves explicitly as Republican or Democratic in orientation,
though increasingly some use terms such as “progressive” and “traditional” to cue
their audiences as to what they can expect.
The way in which openly partisan media facilitate selective exposure is abun-
dantly clear when one compares audience patterns in the United States with
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9. For a review of the evidence of small group interactions, see Sunstein (2002).
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those in a country such as Great Britain, where newspapers openly carry parti-
san labels. In Great Britain, newspaper readers perceive political agreement in
their media in roughly the U-shaped pattern shown in figure 5-1. The pattern of
newspaper readership in Great Britain demonstrates classic evidence of partisan-
based selective exposure (with Conservative and Labour parties replacing Repub-
lican and Democrat, respectively). Strong partisans are the most motivated to
selectively expose, but weaker partisans also do so to a lesser extent. Partisans
can self-select like-minded content at either end of the political spectrum, and thus
strong partisans on both sides are exposed primarily to like-minded political
perspectives in their newspapers.
In the 1990s, there was limited partisan choice among mainstream daily
newspapers in the United States. At least at that time, as shown in figure 5-1,
Republicans found their daily newspapers significantly less compatible with their
political views than Democrats did. Relative to newspaper readers in Great Britain,
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Figure 5-1. Exposure to Like-minded Media Content by Partisanship and
Medium, 1996a
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strong Republican Independent Strong Democrat
Newspapers
Television news
Talk shows
Extent of exposure to like-minded content
Source: Based on the data shown in Mutz and Martin (2001, figure 4A).
a. Respondents were asked about their most frequently used source in each category.
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Americans were not as successful at selective exposure. Most Republicans found less
to like about the partisanship in television news broadcasts than did Democrats.
Not surprisingly, Republicans found talk shows to be highly compatible,
whereas Democrats found little to comport with their views on talk shows.10
Perhaps Americans exercised selective exposure by gravitating to different
media (Republicans to talk shows, Democrats to television) rather than finding
something politically compatible within each medium. But one wonders how
different these patterns would look if the same data were available for 2006.
Since the 1990s, Fox News has provided Republicans with a politically compat-
ible television network, and the number of news sources on television and the
Internet has proliferated. In addition, the availability of openly partisan tele-
vision programs, radio shows, and websites may mean that the pattern of U.S.
news consumption will more closely approximate that of British newspapers in
the not-so-distant future. To the extent that the media environment in the
United States continues to develop along the lines of a niche market based on
partisanship, this new news environment should facilitate selective exposure by
making it easier for people to find the most compatible source of news.
Be that as it may, data demonstrating that selective exposure to media is
responsible for mass polarization do not yet exist. Nonetheless, a recent experi-
mental study of Internet news attempted to mimic the kinds of choices people
make in today’s media environment. Shanto Iyengar and Richard Morin attempted
to document evidence of partisan-based selective exposure by randomly assigning
a set of news stories to four news sources: Fox News, National Public Radio
(NPR), CNN, and the BBC.11 Participants were shown four news story headlines,
one under each news organization’s logo. Participants were then asked which of
the reports they would like to read. This scenario was repeated for articles in six
news categories, including American politics, the war in Iraq, race in America,
crime, travel, and sports. Some respondents were randomly assigned to a control
condition without logos of any kind attached to the stories.
The results suggest that selective exposure is alive and well—even among rel-
atively mainstream news sources. Republicans overwhelmingly preferred stories
from Fox News, whereas Democrats divided between NPR and CNN. Democrats
systematically avoided Fox News, whereas independents demonstrated no par-
ticular pattern of preferences. And while the difference between Republicans
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and Democrats was most pronounced when the stories involved hard news
(such as national politics and the war in Iraq), it did not disappear entirely even
when the story was about possible vacation destinations.
A comparison of how many partisans chose certain stories with news organi-
zation labels versus the same stories without labels provides a clear picture of
how news sources may serve as a guide to selective exposure. Republicans were
three times as likely to choose a news story accompanied by the Fox News logo
as without it, and less likely to choose it if it was labeled a CNN or NPR story.
Among Democrats the pattern was less pronounced; they were somewhat more
likely to choose a story if it was labeled from CNN or NPR and significantly less
likely to choose the same story labeled as being from Fox News. As news con-
sumers increasingly have the ability to customize their news environments to
their own tastes, the likelihood that news will simply reinforce existing views
and produce a subsequent polarization of partisan groups seems all the more
plausible.
Relative to much of the twentieth century, the current direction of political
news seems to portend greater division rather than greater consensus. But in the
midst of considerable alarmism about the impact of modern media, it is worth
remembering that during the days of the openly partisan press of the nineteenth
century, selective exposure was even easier to accomplish. Newspapers of that
era openly aligned themselves with political parties and endorsed candidates on
every page, not just in their editorial content.
But even though the question of whether selective exposure exists seems to
have been resolved affirmatively, the consequences of selective exposure for public
attitudes have not yet been well studied. It is common to assume that if Democrats,
Republicans, and independents all exposed themselves to exactly the same infor-
mation, the public would be less polarized. Perhaps, but some evidence suggests
that this would not happen. Macro-level research on selectivity in the processing
of political information suggests that even if audiences did experience identical
exposure to political information, it might not diminish polarization much
because of the selective way in which partisans interpret new information.
Imagine a situation in which new information becomes available to all three
groups—for example, news that the economy has improved. Assume also that
there is a Republican president in office, so that the president’s job approval
starts out higher among Republicans than among independents, who in turn give
the president more favorable job approval ratings than Democrats do. Nonetheless,
all three partisan groups in a situation such as this generally increase their levels
of presidential approval. In other words, they respond to new information in a
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reasonable manner. Likewise, downturns due to bad news such as declining eco-
nomic indicators would generally cause all three groups’ approval levels to fall.
According to aggregate data compiled over time, Republicans, Democrats, and
independents do indeed respond by changing their views in the same direction—
and to roughly the same extent—in response to new information.12 But this kind
of parallel change is not particularly helpful in reducing polarization. If each
group moves up or down to roughly the same extent, the gap between Republicans
and Democrats remains the same. The two groups are as polarized as before
they received new information.
The underlying assumption of much work on information processing is that
if people were truly unbiased processors of the same political information, they
should ultimately converge in their judgments. As new information becomes
available (perhaps news that the economy has worsened), partisans update their
presidential approval ratings in light of their initial views. The extent of decreased
presidential approval due to negative information should not be even across all
groups, but should be more pronounced in groups that begin with higher levels
of approval. New information matters more when it contradicts initial expecta-
tions. In this scenario, new information should logically result, over time, in a
convergence of opinion. Whether the news is positive or negative, the three
groups’ opinions should move closer and closer together.
Empirical data suggest, however, that convergence is not usually what hap-
pens. Instead, patterns of aggregate opinion suggest that partisanship is a driving
force in how people perceive, interpret, and respond to the political world.13
This means that even if selective exposure to information were not a problem, it is
doubtful that information from mass media would decrease the gap between the
perspectives of Republicans and Democrats. Biased processing is prevalent in
the American public, and partisanship is its driving force.
Biased processing models underscore a skepticism prevalent in contemporary
political psychology that information is the cure-all for what ails the quality of
political decisions. If people are not passive recipients of information, but rather
active choosers, interpreters, and rationalizers, then mass media are severely lim-
ited in what they can do about political polarization. Even if citizens were still
limited to the choice between three indistinguishable network news broadcasts,
biased assimilation models would predict that differences would persist because
of the ways in which people process the information they receive.
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The Internet has become a particular target of concern with respect to selec-
tivity. Law professor Cass Sunstein, author of Republic.com, has suggested that the
cacophony of online political voices, including some very extreme ones, raises
the possibility that extreme political views will be reinforced and encouraged.14
Selectivity is made easier on the Internet by search engines and links between
websites that espouse similar views. The voices represented on the Internet
include those of fringe groups whose extremist ideas would never be covered by
more traditional mainstream media. For many, that alone is cause for concern.
While it is possible (even likely) that these groups have always been out there, they
are more visible and better organized now as a result of the Internet. And even if
their numbers have not increased as a result of the Internet, better organization
means that they could be more likely to pose a threat by taking violent action of
some kind. Still others worry that their mere presence on the Internet encourages
those with similar political leanings by reinforcing and exacerbating the extremity
of their views, and by convincing them that they are not alone and thus need
not abandon their unpopular positions. In all of these scenarios, Internet-based
selective exposure is cause for alarm.
Nonetheless, the irony of all of this hand-wringing about the Internet and
the expansion in the number of political voices on television should not go
without notice. For years, scholars who studied mass media voiced concerns
about the near monopolistic media and the paucity of non-mainstream political
voices on the air or in print. Today, the marketplace is more—and less—ideal.
The proliferation of voices on the Internet means there is a larger marketplace
of political ideas than in the past, but that does not necessarily lead citizens to
freely sample all of its products.
Choosing Whether to Watch Political News
Partisan-driven selectivity is only one mechanism by which increasing media
choice has been tied to increasing polarization. In a more novel argument link-
ing choice and polarization, Markus Prior suggests that greater media choice
in the form of entertainment content, combined with the availability of
twenty-four-hour news channels, has widened the gap between the politically
informed and those without interest and information.15 The rise of cable televi-
sion has clearly changed contemporary presidents’ ability to commandeer the
national airwaves, as political scientists Matthew Baum and Samuel Kernell
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have shown.16 The average size of the audience watching prime-time presidential
addresses and news conferences decreased steadily in the late twentieth century—
a trend that appears to be primarily a function of the availability of cable televi-
sion. Likewise, debate watching fell, particularly among cable viewers. People
without cable are essentially a captive audience, and their debate watching is less
a function of political interest than it is for those with cable, for whom watching
the president on television is clearly a choice.
Many of today’s television viewers no longer need to suffer through a State of the
Union address if they would rather watch a sitcom. In the era of hundreds of chan-
nels from which to choose, viewers need not watch the political debates or presi-
dential press conferences that dominated all three networks not so long ago. There
is always another—and often far more entertaining—choice for the less politically
interested American, from cooking shows to crime dramas to feature films.
The lack of largely involuntary exposure to political content among the less
politically involved, according to Prior, makes this group even less likely to turn
out to vote than before. (On the other hand, there is a steady diet of political
media for political junkies, thus further energizing and reinforcing their proclivities
to be politically active.) Thus, changes in the media environment lead to less invol-
untary exposure to political information and less incidental learning about the
political world. This “byproduct learning,” it is argued, is what motivates the less
politically interested to turn out to vote. Without it, the increasing gap in political
knowledge between the politically interested and uninterested translates into an
increasing turnout gap at the polls. Less politically involved, more moderate voters
are less likely to turn out than before, while the more politically involved are even
more likely to vote than usual. The electorate is thus robbed of its middle, with the
result that the electorate that does go to the polls is more polarized in its views.17
In light of this long chain of proposed causal influences, Prior’s evidence in
support of this theory consists of tests of the many links that make up this larger
process. Using an experiment embedded in a national survey, he randomly
assigned respondents different amounts of choice, asking the hypothetical ques-
tion, “If you had free time at 6 o’clock at night and the following programs were
available, which one would you watch, or would you not watch television then?”
Respondents in the low-choice condition were given only five options: the three
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network news programs, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, and not watching at
all. Respondents in the high-choice condition had those five options, plus several
cable news programs and several entertainment options described as “a comedy or
sitcom program like Friends or The Simpsons,” “a drama program like ER or Law
and Order,” and similar examples from other genres including science fiction,
reality TV, and sports.
The results of Prior’s tests suggest that in the high-choice condition the news
audience is half of what it is in the low-choice condition. To the extent that this
hypothetical situation generalizes to real-world changes in U.S. media, this is a
striking result. But it also raises the question of why so many people watched the
news in the past when it was not what they ideally would have selected. Media
economists suggest that they did so out of habit, as well as a tendency to decide to
watch television before knowing precisely what the viewing options were. This
process no longer rings true for many Americans today. As the ability to “time
shift” the viewing of preferred programs becomes more popular, and the degree
of choice at any one time becomes still more expansive, it seems unlikely that
habitual viewing times will result in much incidental exposure to political content.
A related—and important—matter is whether the politically unenthused
really picked up political knowledge from their incidental viewing in the days of
less choice. And what about the pre-television era, when the literacy levels of the
less educated segments of the population limited their direct access to political
information? Prior suggests that during the pre-television era, when media options
were largely limited to newspapers and radio, a similar gap existed between the
political haves and have-nots, but that television exerted a democratizing influence
on the public, making it less effortful for even the less educated to receive political
news. The less interested still remained less knowledgeable than in the days before
television, but the gap was smaller.
Using National Election Studies data from the 1950s and 1960s, Prior docu-
ments how the number of television stations to which an individual had access
predicts political knowledge, particularly among the less educated segments of
the population. His models suggest that access to television has increased political
interest and turnout among the less educated segments of the population.
With the more recent advent of cable television and the Internet, the gap
between the politically informed and uninformed should be widening again in the
contemporary population. To measure this, Prior develops the concept of “relative
entertainment preference”—that is, the extent to which a given respondent prefers
entertainment over news. One measure involves directly asking people what
genre they like best from a list of ten categories, then having them select a second,
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third, and fourth favorite. Of the remaining options, they are allowed to indicate
those that they “really dislike.” The respondents who claim to actively dislike news
are at the high end of the “relative entertainment preference” scale, while those who
indicate neither a like nor a dislike are next highest, and those who rank news
among their four favorite types of programs are at the lower end of the scale.
Central to Prior’s thesis is the group he dubs “switchers,” people who will
switch from news viewing to entertainment viewing when given the choice. This
is the segment of the population whose level of political knowledge (and level of
turnout at the polls) should be most affected by greater choice. Because switchers
abandon news once they have a choice of entertainment content, they reduce
their incidental exposure to political content, which in turn limits their accidental
political learning.
Prior’s thesis presents a conundrum for a society that is addicted to choice.
Some segments of the population will expose themselves to political news vol-
untarily and turn out to vote regularly regardless of the shape of the current news
environment. Others will not watch political news regardless of how little choice
they have, and they are unlikely to bother voting in any case. But for those on the
margins of these groups—those who are not political activists, yet not totally
disengaged—incidental exposure to the political world is an important way in
which they are drawn into the political process. Without involuntary exposure
to political media, these more moderate voters will drop out of the electoral
process, and the voting public will be increasingly extreme in its composition.
Losers’ Consent in an Age of Illegitimacy
Yet another way in which media may contribute to political polarization stems
from the nature of contemporary media content during elections. It has been
often observed, extensively documented, and widely lamented that election cov-
erage tends to emphasize the “behind-the-scenes” insider perspective on what
drives election outcomes. Rather than emphasize the substantive reasons why
voters might have selected one candidate over another, media coverage tends to
emphasize the role of political consultants, advertising campaigns, and other
factors that have less to do with the quality of the candidate or the extent to
which aspects of his agenda resonate with voters, and more to do with strategic
aspects of how campaigns are waged.
In his book Out of Order, Thomas E. Patterson documented the stark increase
in this type of coverage from the 1960s through the 1990s.18 Patterson’s analysis
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shows that it is not simply that horse-race coverage—that is, coverage of who is
ahead and who is falling behind—remains popular among journalists. (Indeed,
many argue that horse-race coverage is a time-honored journalistic tradition that
predates both polls and television.)19 But in comparison with forty or fifty years
ago, there is now far more of what Patterson calls “game-centered” coverage of
elections, in which journalists focus on the suspense and speculation about likely
winners and losers and the behind-the-scenes machinations of candidates and
their staffs. As Patterson notes:
The game schema dominates the journalist’s outlook in part because it
conforms to the conventions of the news process. . . . The conventions of
news reporting include an emphasis on the more dramatic and controversial
aspects of politics. . . . The game is always moving: candidates are continually
adjusting to the dynamics of the race and their position in it. Since it can
almost always be assumed that the candidates are driven by a desire to win,
their actions can hence be interpreted as an effort to acquire votes. The
game is thus a perpetually reliable source of new material.20
Patterson’s analysis of New York Times coverage between 1960 and 1992
demonstrates that in 1960 the majority of election stories were framed as stories
about candidates’ policy positions. By 1992, election stories were six times more
likely to be framed in the context of campaign strategy than as policy stories.
Over the course of several decades, stories about candidates’ policy positions were
replaced by an increasing number of articles about the campaigns themselves.
In what comes across as an effort to give ordinary people a behind-the-scenes
perspective on how elections are run, today’s election coverage is replete with
analyses of the strategic decisions involved in campaigning for office. When a
presidential candidate gives a speech about health care in Atlanta, campaign
journalists are likely to frame the event not in terms of a discussion of health care
policy or the candidate’s platform, but as an effort to woo southern voters. For
reporters—and perhaps for their audiences as well—the text is not nearly as
interesting as the subtext.
Some speculate that journalists highlight the strategic aspects of campaigns as
a means of insulating their readers and viewers from the more manipulative
aspects of campaigns; if audiences are aware of candidates’ real intentions and
the reasons for their actions, then surely they will not be duped by them. In his
book Seducing America, Roderick P. Hart has suggested that strategic coverage is
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popular with the public because it gives them the illusion of being informed and
knowing what is really happening in the campaign.21
The problem with constant reporting on the campaign is that it suggests to
news media audiences that being persuaded by a politician is a bad thing, a sign of
weakness, gullibility, or stupidity. For the same reason that no one admits to having
his or her mind changed by a political ad, few Americans see open-mindedness
to campaign propaganda as a good thing. Another problem with game-centric
coverage is that it shifts the audience’s attention away from what is being said
(on health care, for example) toward the journalist’s perspective on the strategic
reason why it is being said.
From the perspective of polarization, why is the rise in this kind of coverage a
concern? The link to polarization comes later in the election process, after the win-
ners and losers have already been decided. To the extent that citizens are con-
vinced by game-centric coverage that elections are won or lost by the right choice
of advertisements, a new haircut, the best speechwriters, or the cleverest consultants,
one could understand why voters on the losing side in any given contest might
feel they have been robbed. The best advertisements do not necessarily mean the
best presidents, and a good haircut seldom leads to good governance. Moreover,
a good campaign can be waged by a weak candidate, and a bad campaign by a
strong candidate.
It is a much more polarizing experience to think that one’s candidate lost an
election because of a minor misstatement, a failure to look good on television,
or a failure to hire the right advertising agency than to think that he lost because
his policy ideas were less popular than his opponent’s. If electoral victories are,
according to the press, about the candidate’s ability to play the game, then electoral
losses also are about the candidate’s failure to play the game well.
Empirical evidence backs up this broad argument, though scholars have yet to
test the multiple steps in this process within a single study. For example, there is
considerable empirical evidence of the media’s increased emphasis on the strategic
aspects of campaigns. A separate body of evidence suggests that the explanations
the mass media put forth for how an election was won or lost are widely adopted
by the public. Today’s media coverage is more likely to suggest apolitical, illegit-
imate explanations for a candidate’s electoral victory, and the public on the losing
side is likely to believe them.22 A belief that one’s side has experienced an illegit-
imate loss, in turn, prompts the losing partisans to become increasingly angry
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and frustrated. If one believes the other side won by running deceitful ads, then
it is easy to villainize the opposition and thus create more extreme perceptions
of the consequences of one political choice over another. At this point, it is no
longer about differing political philosophies; it is about right versus wrong,
truth versus deceit, good versus evil.
The link in this chain of events that has not been well documented is the extent
to which delegitimizing explanations lead to more polarized views, particularly
in the form of an intensified dislike for the “other side.” In a 2005 book, Losers’
Consent, Christopher J. Anderson and his coauthors examine the role that elections
play in legitimizing their own outcomes. For citizens who end up on the winning
side in a given contest, accepting the outcome is not particularly difficult. But
what produces consent from the losers? Not surprisingly, those who participate
in an election but end up on the losing side are significantly more negative
about their system of government. Losing naturally leads to anger, particularly if
the loss is seen as illegitimate—and evaluations of the legitimacy of elections and
democracy are significantly less positive among losers than among winners.23
Although it has yet to be tested, one would likewise expect that those
exposed to media coverage that emphasizes delegitimizing explanations of an
election outcome—such as the idea that the election was won primarily by ads
containing lies or half-truths—should come away from the experience of loss
more polarized in their views. Nobody wants to end up on the losing side, but
losing to an opponent who won for the wrong reasons would be expected to cre-
ate much more negative feeling toward the opposition.
By suggesting this, I do not mean to refer specifically to the unusual, extremely
close election outcomes that occurred in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections,
though they obviously come to mind. The more general point is that regardless of
how lopsided an outcome might be, media coverage plays an important role in
structuring explanations for why one side was victorious and the other side failed.
Once the people have spoken, it is the mass media that decide what they have
said. To the extent that delegitimizing explanations are encouraged by the press
and adopted by the losing side, a more polarized electorate is likely to be the result.
Media Bracketing of Acceptable Opinion
Yet another explanation linking the media to political polarization originates
in two studies of the role of the news media as a political institution. In a 1984
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study, political scientist Dan Hallin examined the oft-repeated assertion that
during the war in Vietnam the American news media (television in particular)
became more oppositional toward government and thus helped lead public
opinion away from support for the war. In Hallin’s study of political elites,
media coverage, and mass opinion, he found little support for this thesis of an
oppositional media. Although media coverage of the war did become increasingly
critical after the Tet Offensive in 1967, Hallin demonstrated that this was because
elite opinion became more divided on the war at that time. By relying on elite
sources, reporters mirrored the division of elite opinion—and subsequently
their coverage influenced the range of opinions held by the mainstream public
as well.24
Hallin’s study pointed to the importance of the mass media in “bracketing”
the range of acceptable opinion for the public. By defining the boundaries of
acceptable controversy, the media define the range of legitimate opinions that
the public may adopt. An issue such as Vietnam may shift over time from the
sphere of consensus to the sphere of legitimate controversy, but this is a top-
down phenomenon originating with elites rather than with the media. Others
have similarly noted that media coverage tends to be “indexed” to the range of
elite opinion rather than more broadly to the range of mass opinion.25
When members of Congress represent some of the more extreme positions
(as they do now), it follows then, as a result of journalists’ tendency to rely on
official sources, that those more extreme viewpoints are also more likely to be
covered by the press. Although the views that are covered originate with elites
(such as members of Congress), the media play an important role in conferring
legitimacy on a given range of views simply by covering those perspectives regu-
larly, but not others. What this process suggests is that by covering what is
essentially a more polarized group of political elites, journalists may be offering
a wider range of acceptable views to the public and thus discouraging consensus.
If the smorgasbord of views offered in today’s media represents greater extremes
than in the past, then it is perhaps not surprising that more of the public now
endorses more extreme views.
This “indexing” or “bracketing” hypothesis has been relatively well documented
in terms of the effects that political elites have on the range of views reported in
mainstream media. But the impact of indexing on the mass public within those
media audiences is less well studied. By simply broadening the range of views
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they present, does media coverage also produce a public with more diverse
views? The jury is still out with respect to the impact on the public.
To the extent that this mechanism of polarization holds true, it suggests that
perhaps the media critics of the previous generation should have been more
careful about what they wished for. In a paradoxical way, longtime critics of the
lack of diversity in media and the lack of representation for more extreme voices
have seen the change they desired: there is no question that today’s media carry
a broader range of political perspectives than they did a generation ago. But the
very diversity of those same voices may encourage the public to adopt more
polar positions—an unforeseen and less desirable consequence of a more vibrant
marketplace of political ideas.
In-Your-Face Politics: Gut Reactions to Televised Incivility
“Shout-show” television has been the target of a tremendous amount of criticism
from many quarters, academic and otherwise. The world of political disagreement
as witnessed through the lens of political talk shows is quite polarized. Increased
competition for audiences has led many programs on political topics to liven them-
selves up in order to increase audience size.26 Thus, political talk shows such as
The McLaughlin Group, The O’Reilly Factor, Meet the Press, Capital Gang, Hardball,
and many others tend to involve particularly intense and heated exchanges.
The issue of contentiousness and incivility in political discourse was brought to
a head in October 2004, when Daily Show host Jon Stewart appeared on Cross-
fire and openly criticized this program (and others like it) for its “partisan hack-
ery,” which Stewart said was “hurting America.” Is there any truth to Stewart’s
claim? Aside from the obvious distastefulness some find in watching politicians
scream, yell, and interrupt one another for thirty minutes or more, how is this
kind of in-your-face politics implicated as a potential cause of mass polarization?
The tendency on television is to highlight more emotionally extreme and less
polite expressions of opinion, and research suggests that these expressions of
incivility may have important consequences for attitudes toward the opposition.
These consequences flow from the fact that politeness and civility are more than
mere social norms; they are means of demonstrating mutual respect.27 In other
words, uncivil discourse increases polarization by helping partisans think even
less of their opponents than they already did.
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And yet market forces seem to favor the kind of television that encourages
polarization. Polarized political discourse and an angry opposition makes for
compelling television. Viewers may claim that they find it disgusting, but they
cannot help watching—just as passing motorists cannot help “rubbernecking”
when there is an accident alongside the highway. It is not that people actually
enjoy what they are seeing, but there is something about information of this
kind—information about life and death, about conflict and warring tribes in a
dispute—that makes it difficult to ignore. Evolutionary psychologists have
pointed to the adaptive advantage of having brains that automatically pay attention
to conflict as a means of staying alive in an earlier era. At a cognitive level, of
course, no one really expects to be caught in the “crossfire” of a televised partisan
shout-fest. But even when it is “only television,” and thus poses no real threat of
bodily harm, people cannot help but watch and react to incivility.
My own research suggests that psychologists are correct about the demands
of incivility on human attentional processes. To examine the difference that
incivility makes independent of political content, I produced a mock political
talk show—on a professional television set using professional actors as congres-
sional candidates. The candidates espoused the same issue positions and made
exactly the same arguments for and against various issue positions in two different
versions of the program. In one discussion, however, they raised their voices, rolled
their eyes, and engaged in an impolite, uncivil exchange. In the civil version of
the program, they spoke calmly, refrained from interrupting one another, and
showed mutual respect simply by obeying the social norms for polite discourse.28
The differences in viewer reactions to the two programs were startling. The
group randomly assigned to the uncivil version of the political discussion came
away with roughly the same feelings toward their preferred candidate as those in
the civil group. But attitudes toward the “other side” became much more intensely
negative when the two exchanged views in an uncivil manner. The more dramatic,
uncivil exchanges encouraged a more black-and-white view of the world: their
candidate was not just the best; the alternative was downright evil.
This effect was evident for partisans on both sides of the political spectrum
and regardless of which candidate they liked best. Interestingly, watching the
uncivil version led to greater polarization in perceptions of “us” versus “them,”
relative to a control group, but watching the civil version of the exchange led to
decreased levels of polarization. This pattern of findings suggests that political
television has the potential to improve as well as to exacerbate the divide among
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partisans of opposing views; it simply depends upon how those differences of
opinion are aired. When differences of opinion are conveyed in a manner that
suggests mutual respect, viewers are able to understand and process the ratio-
nales on the other side and are less likely to see the opposition in starkly nega-
tive terms. Differences of opinion are perceived as having some legitimate and
reasonable basis. But when those same views and rationales are expressed in an
uncivil manner, people respond with an emotional, gut-level reaction, rejecting
the opposition as unfairly and viciously attacking one’s cherished views.
Using indicators of physiological response, my studies also demonstrate that
televised incivility causes viewers’ levels of emotional arousal to increase, just as
they do when people encounter face-to-face incivility. In the face of real-world
conflict, this reaction supposedly serves a functional purpose—participants are
given the rush of adrenaline they may need to flee the situation. But with tele-
vised incivility, this kind of reaction serves no purpose; it is simply a remnant of
brains that have not adapted to twentieth-century representational technology.29
Even though viewers are just third-party observers of other people’s conflicts
on television, they show heightened levels of emotional arousal, just as people
do when encountering face-to-face disagreement. This is not so surprising if one
considers how it feels to be a third-party observer of a couple’s argument at a
dinner party. The same discomfort, awkwardness, and tension exist, even for
those not directly involved in the conflict. Likewise, when political commentator
Robert Novak stormed off the set of a live broadcast of CNN’s Inside Politics in
August 2004, viewers were uncomfortable—and they paid attention. The tension
was palpable to viewers, even though few may be able to remember what the
substance of the conflict was.
The heightened arousal produced by incivility can make it difficult to process
the substance of the exchange. Some arousal helps to call attention to what other-
wise might be considered bland and uninteresting. But at extremely high levels
of arousal, people will remember only the emotional content of the program
(who screamed at whom, who stomped off in a pique) and recall little of the
substance of the disagreement. As anyone who has ever had an argument knows,
there is a point at which the emotional content of the exchange overwhelms any
potential for rational discourse. As a result, viewers gain little understanding of
the other side. They perceive their own side of the debate as unfairly attacked,
and thus the incivility their own candidate displays is simply an appropriate
level of righteous indignation in reaction to an unprovoked attack. The incivility
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demonstrated by the opponent demonstrates that he is a raving lunatic, wholly
unfit for office.
In addition to this disdain for the opposing side, incivility produces a second
important reaction—heightened attention. As Bill O’Reilly, host of The O’Reilly
Factor, suggests, “If a radio producer can find someone who eggs on conservative
listeners to spout off and prods liberals into shouting back, he’s got a hit show.
The best host is the guy or gal who can get the most listeners extremely annoyed—
over and over and over again.”30 Evidently, these sorts of shows have hooked
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), who indicated that she and her
husband Bill now have TiVo, a technology that allows a viewer to record and
replay television programs. And for what purpose do the senator and the former
president use TiVo? According to Senator Clinton, they use it to record the most
outrageous statements made by their political opponents so they can play them
over and over and yell back at the television.31 An optimist might regard this
vignette as an example of how viewers are not necessarily selectively exposing
themselves to politically compatible media. But the pessimist would undoubtedly
point out that yet another media mechanism of polarization has kicked in to
take its place. Uncivil political discourse that produces such strong emotional
reactions is unlikely to further the cause of political moderation.
Controlled laboratory studies suggest, for better or worse, that O’Reilly is
correct: incivility is extremely entertaining and people like to watch it, even if it
is just to scream back. Despite the fact that many viewers claim to be repulsed
by it, the respondents who viewed the identical but uncivil version of the same
program always rated it as more entertaining, found it more exciting to watch, and
indicated a greater desire to see the uncivil program again than the civil version.32
Polite conversation is boring, and the deliberative ideal for political discourse
makes for dull television. “I acknowledge there are some good points on my
opponent’s side” will probably never make good television, whereas “These evil
people must be stopped!” always will.
With these findings in mind, it is important to consider the extent to which
the rise of televised political incivility can help explain mass polarization. Is
political discourse truly any more uncivil now than in the past? Some have sug-
gested that the United States is in the midst of a “civility crisis” in its public life.
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As then University of Pennsylvania president Judith Rodin argued in 1996,
“Across America and increasingly around the world, from campuses to the halls of
Congress, to talk radio and network TV, social and political life seem dominated
today by incivility. . . . No one seems to question the premise that political
debate has become too extreme, too confrontational, too coarse.”33 Similar calls
for greater civility in political discourse have come from a wide array of scholars,
as well as from philanthropic organizations.
Some scholars concur that incivility is on the rise. Political scientist Eric M.
Uslaner, for example, has suggested that members of Congress are increasingly
likely to violate norms of politeness in their discourse.34 Linguist Deborah Tannen
has characterized the United States as having “a culture of argument” that
encourages “a pervasive warlike atmosphere” for resolving differences of opinion.35
Even journalists concur that “hyperbole and venomous invective have become
the order of the day” in American politics.36
Clearly, there is a widespread perception that political discourse is much more
uncivil now than in the past, but there is little historical evidence to confirm
such a trend. As then senator Zell Miller (D-Ga.) implied when he wistfully said
he would like to challenge Hardball host Chris Matthews to a duel, violence
among political opponents was once far more common than it is now. Senator
Miller’s statement was made during an uncivil exchange between himself and a
journalist during the 2004 Republican National Convention. It made headlines,
precisely because the idea of using weapons to resolve political differences
seemed absurd. We have not had a duel to the death among politicians for many
years, and thus one could easily characterize today’s political talk shows as mild
by comparison.
So is it fair to say that incivility is on the rise in political discourse? There is no
definitive answer to this question, but the increased visibility of uncivil conflicts
on television seems indisputable. Although politicians of past eras may frequently
have exchanged harsh words, without television cameras there to record these
events and to replay them for a mass audience their impact on public perceptions
was probably substantially lower. The dominance of television as a source of
exposure to politics suggests that public exposure to uncivil political discourse has
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increased. Moreover, it is one thing to read about political pundits’ or candidates’
contrary views in the press, and quite another to witness them directly engaged
in vituperative argument. The sensory realism of television conveys a sense of
intimacy with political actors that people were unlikely to encounter in the past,
even among the few lucky enough to have face-to-face meetings.
Television provides a uniquely intimate perspective on conflict. In the literature
on human proxemics, the distance deemed appropriate for face-to-face inter-
actions with public figures in American culture is more than twelve feet.37 Yet
exposure to politicians on television gives the appearance of being much closer.
When people are arguing, the tendency is to back off and put greater space
between those who disagree. Instead, when political conflicts flare up on television,
cameras tend to go in for tighter and tighter close-ups. This creates an intense
experience for the viewers, one in which they view conflict from an unusually
intimate perspective. Political scientist Jane J. Mansbridge has noted that when
open political conflict occurs in real life, bringing people together in one another’s
presence can intensify their anger and aggression.38 To the extent that a television
presence has similar effects, incivility is likely to encourage polarization.
What Are the Prospects?
In thinking about the prospects for the future, it is useful to consider separately
and collectively the four mechanisms by which the media may be involved in the
polarization of the mass public. Two of these mechanisms, discouraging losers’
consent and bracketing the range of acceptable opinion, are driven by the content
of news media. In one case, journalists’ game-centric coverage of campaigns is
implicated, and in the other, the diversity of political voices affects the range of
mass opinion. The other two mechanisms are driven more or less by technological
change. Because of the proliferation of channels on cable television, along with
the development of the Internet, most Americans have access to more partisan
political voices than they ever did before. Whether through partisan-based selective
exposure, or through selective avoidance of political content altogether, the dis-
tribution of opinion in the electorate has changed. Finally, the ability of television
to present an unnatural “in-your-face” perspective on politicians may have further
increased levels of vitriol directed toward the opposition.
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How likely is it that these processes will change? Theoretically, the mechanisms
based on media content could become less tenable if journalistic norms were to
change. For example, if not only Crossfire were taken off the air, but also every
other uncivil shout-fest show that involves politics, then one could see how this
polarizing mechanism might abate in significance. Likewise, if campaign cover-
age were to shift away from its predominantly strategic angle and focus instead
on taking political statements at face value, one could imagine losers who would
be less angry about the opposition’s victory, particularly if it were deemed to
result from legitimate differences of opinion. There are several problems with
such proposed changes, of course. Even if they were possible to implement
(which they are not), it seems unlikely that they would offer tenable solutions or
even modest improvements on the current situation.
News is commerce, to be sure. What all four of the mechanisms described in
this chapter share is a tension between drawing viewers, readers, and listeners to
political media, and producing media content that does not encourage polarized
political perspectives. The goal of niche marketing and the extent of choice is to
give viewers more of what they want, but not necessarily more of what they
need. Likewise, the game-centric, campaign-oriented journalism that is so common
today exists because viewers and readers find such discussions of interest. The
greater publicity that extreme views now receive probably also helps draw larger
audiences. It is far more dramatic to show starkly opposed foes engaged in battle
than to illustrate the political world with two moderates calmly discussing their
small differences. If it were not for the need to make politics more interesting
for marginally politically involved viewers, then it is doubtful that there would
be a need for confrontational shout shows to exist either.
Moreover, any changes to media content designed to alleviate the impact of
one of these mechanisms are likely to replace one mechanism of media polariza-
tion with another. Take, for example, the incivility that is so prevalent in political
talk shows. What would happen if producers were to tone down these programs
so that levels of civility approached the norms of everyday people in their social
interactions? On the one hand, viewers would not have the chance to intensify
their dislike for the opposition by viewing uncivil repartee. But on the other
hand, in-your-face incivility is precisely what people like about these shows. In
study after study, even those who responded negatively to incivility reported
that the uncivil shows were more interesting and exciting to watch. Those
exposed to the civil versions of the same show were far less likely to indicate any
interest in seeing it again or in watching it regularly. As a result, in a hypothetical
era of civil political television, those viewers would be unlikely to watch at all.
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They would fall into the category of viewers that Prior refers to as “switchers”—
people who would switch to entertainment when given a choice—and thus fall
out of the reach of political information altogether.
Three general approaches to improving this situation are possible. The first is to
push for less commercial pressure. In Breaking the News, James Fallows excoriates
his fellow journalists for turning news coverage into more of an effort to entertain
than to edify. He faults the focus of media companies on their bottom lines as the
source of the corruption of news.39 From a broader perspective, however, it seems
too facile to claim that the commercial interests of U.S. media companies are to
blame. What Fallows misses is that even if all political content were government-
funded, the lack of commercial pressures would not alleviate the need to attract
audiences to political content. In order to do good or harm, political news must
have large audiences; high-minded programs with small audiences are hardly
better than no programs at all.
A second, equally fruitless, approach has been to wag fingers accusingly at the
civically bankrupt American public. Why is it, many ask, that Americans do not
take their civic duty more seriously and educate themselves on political issues?
A third option is to change the shape of political media so that they can draw
audiences without inadvertently polarizing the public. Traditional television
news programs are in a state of turmoil these days over which direction to take.
Do they reinvent themselves to become more like entertainment programs and vie
for audiences on the edge of political interest? Or do they take the so-called high
road and remain serious and hard-hitting? The problem with the high road is
that even if it leads to critical acclaim and journalistic respect, it is unlikely to draw
in the politically marginal audiences who prefer to watch entertainment. By
many normative accounts, doing the “right thing” would result in precisely the
wrong effect—further chipping away at the proportion of Americans who expose
themselves to politically relevant television content.
In a 2005 interview, CBS chairman Leslie Moonves indicated just how drasti-
cally he thinks traditional news broadcasts must be revamped in order to increase
audiences and survive. “We have to break the mold,” he stated. The alternatives
Moonves has considered include mold-breaking formats ranging from the com-
edy of Jon Stewart’s mock news program, The Daily Show, to the zany humor of
England’s The Big Breakfast, to Canada’s Naked News, during which anchors
present a newscast while doing a striptease.40
how the mass media divide us 247
39. Fallows (1996).
40. Lynn Hirschberg, “Giving Them What They Want,” New York Times Magazine, September
4, 2005.
Copyright 2006, the Brookings Institution and the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.
These solutions—comedy and sex—are only two of many possible alternative
attention-generating mechanisms. But those pursuing the solution need to move
away from the premise that commercial pressures alone are responsible and real-
ize that this is a problem that has been faced before, albeit in very different contexts.
Children’s television, for example, was once widely bemoaned as antisocial in its
consequences. Kids were particularly drawn to highly arousing, violent programs—
precisely the kind of content most feared by parents. Yet through collaborations
with researchers, organizations such as the Children’s Television Workshop were
able to draw on knowledge of human behavior to come up with alternative means
of grabbing children’s attention. The early evidence on entertainment-oriented
news programs is promising in demonstrating that audiences do learn something
about politics from their content.41 While it is not unreasonable to be optimistic
that answers will be found, it seems foolhardy at this point to try to predict the
future of political media.
The underlying question that still needs to be confronted—by scholars as well
as those in the media business—is how to make a topic that is not inherently
interesting to many Americans nonetheless exciting to watch. And if the answer
is not behind-the-scenes coverage of election strategy, or mudslinging on political
talk shows, or partisan extremists rallying the troops, then what will keep those
politically marginal citizens from watching movies on cable instead?
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